Religious communities, immigration, and social cohesion in rural areas: Evidence from England by Andrews, R. (Rhys)
 1 
Andrews, R. (2011). Religious Communities, Immigration and Social Cohesion in Rural 
Areas: Evidence from England. Rural Sociology, 76(4): 535-561. 
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ABSTRACT Religious communities are important sources of bridging and bonding social 
capital, which, in turn, have varying implications for perceptions of social cohesion in rural 
areas. In particular, as well as cultivating cohesiveness more broadly, the bridging social 
capital associated within mainline religious communities may represent an especially 
important source of support for the social integration of new immigrant groups. Although the 
bonding social capital associated with evangelical communities is arguably less conducive to 
wider social cohesion, it may prompt outreach work by those communities, which can 
enhance immigrant integration. This paper examines these assumptions by exploring the 
relationship between mainline and evangelical religious communities, immigration and 
residents’ perceptions of social cohesion in rural areas in England. The separate and 
combined effects of religious communities and economic in-migration on social cohesion are 
modelled using multivariate statistical techniques. The analysis suggests that mainline 
Protestant communities enhance social cohesion in rural England, while evangelical 
communities do not. The social integration of immigrants appears to be more likely where 
mainline Protestant and Catholic communities are strong, but is unaffected by the strength of 
evangelical ones.  
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Introduction 
Analysis of the causes and consequences of variations in cohesion amongst members of 
communities has a venerable history within rural sociology (e.g. Sorokin, 1928; Warren, 
1978; Wilkinson, 1991). Much of this work reflected the notion that the population 
movements, which accompanied rural restructuring during the past century have posed a 
serious challenge to the viability and cohesiveness of rural communities. In particular, 
beyond the problems associated with poverty, socio-economic disadvantage and social 
heterogeneity, the arrival of new immigrant groups within rural areas may disturb long-held 
norms of social interaction within an area as residents are confronted with newcomers who 
may look different and bring dissimilar social and cultural practices (Naples, 1994; Neal, 
2002). Immigration may test long-term rural residents’ psychological need for control over 
their social environment (Chavez, 2005) by challenging existing preferences for homophily 
(Blau, 1977) or according to the ‘racial threat’ hypothesis prompting feelings of anxiety and 
insecurity (Blalock, 1967), which can weaken perceptions of cohesion within a given area 
(Quillian, 1995). At the same time, the ‘social contact’ hypothesis suggests that immigration 
can stimulate cross-cultural interaction leading to a corresponding reduction in out-group 
hostility, especially where social conditions are conducive to positive interactions (Allport, 
1954). Yet despite a growing literature exploring immigrant integration in urban immigrant 
destinations, few researchers have studied the dynamics of the relationships between 
immigration and social sources of integration in rural areas. This study is intended to address 
this important issue by examining the recent historic movement of Central and Eastern 
European migrant workers into rural areas across England. 
Social scientists agree that civil society is likely to bear a great responsibility for 
addressing the integration of immigrants within an area (e.g. Putnam, 2007; Theodore and 
Martin, 2007). In particular, the religious communities present within areas experiencing 
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immigration may play a vital role in this process.  The ‘moral communities’ thesis developed 
by sociologists of religion suggests that religious groups and institutions build social 
cohesion within an area by fostering community integration and enhancing informal social 
control (Stark, Doyle and Kent, 1980; Welch, Tittle and Petee, 1991). However, subsequent 
developments in social science have led scholars to develop a more nuanced account of the 
contribution that different religious communities might make to social cohesion. Critically, 
Christian religious denominations often differ greatly in terms of doctrine, and so adherents 
of those denominations might well have divergent attitudes towards the community beyond 
the congregation. As well as exhibiting important doctrinal differences, denominations also 
vary in terms of the institutional support that they (are able to) offer to members and non-
members, both in developed countries, such as the U.K. (Bruce, 1995) and developing ones, 
such as Mozambique (Agadjanan, 2001). One fruitful lens through which these 
denominational differences can be analysed is the distinction between mainline (or 
mainstream) and evangelical religious communities (e.g. Moorhead, 1999; Tipton, 2008). 
Although many Christian denominations do not fall neatly into a single category (see Green, 
2005), it is possible to observe broad differences in doctrine and structure across the principal 
denominations in both North America and England. 
Mainline Christian communities (Anglicans, Catholics, and Methodists in England) 
are associated with churches that have a long history and tradition. These churches tend to 
have a formal organizational structure and arguably promote a commitment to social 
responsibility or a strong “communitarian ethic”, which is elevated above the duties of church 
membership (Greeley, 1989). Mainline communities are also often more accepted within the 
civil society of the countries in which they are found and can draw upon a broader spread of 
funding sources than their evangelical counterparts. Core characteristics of the churches 
associated with evangelical communities include a certain degree of newness, frequently the 
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result of some kind of revival movement. Such communities tend to place a great stress upon 
personal conversion (being ‘born again’), the authority of the bible and the spiritual leader, 
and the importance of a religious foundation for social activism (Bebbington, 2008). 
Evangelical communities may eschew mainstream social structures, and their churches are 
often entirely dependent upon donations from their members. According to some social 
scientists, such variations in doctrine and institutional structure have important implications 
for how the different communities interact with the rest of society.   
Robert Putnam (2000) claimed that mainline Protestants and Catholics within the US 
were more likely to be involved in service to the wider community than evangelical 
Christians who, by contrast, exhibit an inward focus on their own religious community. This, 
in turn, has led Beyerlein and Hipp (2005) to consider adherence to mainline Christianity a 
direct measure of bridging social capital (interactions that connect diverse actors), and 
adherence to evangelical Christianity a measure of bonding social capital (interactions that 
connect like-minded actors). Social capital encompasses “social networks and the norms of 
reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them” (Putnam, 2000, 19). As such, it is 
characterized by distinctive bridging (inclusive) and bonding (exclusive) aspects, which may 
embrace myriad diverse in and out-group identities or reinforce exclusive in-group identities. 
While some scholars have focused on the benefits emerging from “bridging” interactions 
connecting many different actors as the source of social capital (e.g. Granovetter, 1973), 
others emphasize the “bonding” nature of the shared norms that underpin group membership 
(e.g. Coleman 1994). The significance of Beyelein and Hipp’s argument is that whereas 
bridging social capital is thought to promote interconnectedness across the wider community 
and thereby generate social cohesion (Bellair, 1997), bonding social capital may sometimes 
have the opposite effect by increasing group insularity and, in turn, social fragmentation 
(Sampson, Morenoff and Earls, 1999).  
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Based on these notions, it is possible to derive some broad expectations about the 
likely role that different Christian communities might play in the process of immigrant 
integration in rural areas. Firstly, mainline denominations might have the institutional 
strength required to be able to coordinate opportunities for positive encounters between 
existing residents and newcomers, evoke political responses to the needs of immigrants, fund 
bespoke support services, or run community awareness-raising events and workshops. This, 
in turn, might advance the interests of immigrant groups in ways that contribute to their 
successful integration within the host area (Schneider, 2007). Secondly, mainline religious 
communities may also be especially well-placed to assist in the process of integration 
because immigrants are often already affiliated to these communities in their home country. 
For example, Catholic religious communities in the U.S. have a long history of providing 
support for and advocacy on behalf of affiliated immigrant groups (Menjivar, 2003). 
Thirdly, on the face of it, evangelical communities might seem less likely to take an 
interest in the welfare of non-member groups. Nevertheless, despite the hypothesized 
insularity of these communities, it is conceivable that their missionary zeal may actually drive 
them to reach out to immigrants as a source of potential converts (Menjivar, 2003). Not only 
are there strong doctrinal reasons for individuals to pursue ‘salvation’ in this way, but the 
hierarchical structure of evangelical communities may also prompt immigrant outreach work, 
especially where it is seen as high priority by the spiritual leader. Indeed, community leaders 
from evangelical communities joined forces with mainline ones to mobilize congregations to 
participate in the immigrant marches across U.S. cities in 2006 (Pantoja, Menjivar and 
Magana, 2008). Whether by responding to the needs of immigrant groups or providing 
platforms for collective action in their interest, the institutional strength and embeddedness of 
mainline religious communities could therefore hold the key to the social integration of 
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immigrants in rural areas, while the proselytizing fervor of evangelical communities too may 
play a vitally important role. 
This paper analyzes the separate and combined effects of religious communities and 
immigration on perceptions of social cohesion in rural areas across England using 
multivariate statistical techniques. In the first part of the paper, the literature on the 
contribution of religious communities and immigration to social cohesion is reviewed, before 
their interactive effects within rural areas are theorized. Measures of social cohesion, 
religious communities, immigration and relevant control variables are identified. Results of a 
statistical model of the separate and joint effects of religious community membership and 
immigration on residents’ perceptions of social cohesion in rural areas across England are 
then presented, and their implications discussed. 
 
Religious Communities and Social Cohesion 
According to many observers, industrial restructuring during the twentieth century prompted 
a series of population movements in and out of rural areas, which have caused the re-
evaluation of existing social identities in ways that have often proved detrimental to people’s 
well-being (Fraser et al. 2005; Nelson 1999). This, in turn, has placed great pressure on the 
key social and institutional bases of community strength within rural areas, such as local 
schools, businesses, and religious groups (Cotter, 2004; Gray, 1994). As rural communities 
have undergone a process of transformation, so these institutions have had to work hard to 
adapt to the changing social, political and economic circumstances that they face. In 
particular, the religious communities within rural areas, though at risk of marginalization as 
population turnover inhibits the growth of group membership and commitment, remain a 
potentially critical source of social support for individuals (Halseth, 1999). Indeed, such 
communities remain a vital touchstone for the lives of rural Americans (Elder and Conger, 
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2000). Case study research in England too suggests that religious communities still play a 
vital role organizing and coordinating formal and informal activities that contribute to 
community vibrancy in rural areas (see Furbey et al. 2006), albeit to a lesser extent than was 
the case in the past (King, 2009).   
In England, the Anglican parochial ministry has occupied a central place within the 
community life of country parishes for many centuries (Russell, 1986; Francis and 
Lanksheart, 1992), and, despite declining congregations, continues to marshal more material 
and human resources than most other non-state actors within rural England. For example, the 
Anglican Church is a statutory provider of education in England and runs about a quarter of 
all elementary schools, including almost half of those in rural areas. The Catholic Church too 
is responsible for the provision of a small amount of elementary schooling, whilst a tiny 
number of Methodist run schools are still in existence (Berkeley and Vij, 2008).
1
 Although 
evangelical religious communities, such as the Baptists and Pentecostals, have many 
adherents within the rural areas of England, they are not only deeply embedded in the social 
and political structure of those areas, often relying solely on the contributions of members 
and having little institutional expression beyond the Church. Thus, these communities 
arguably play less of a role in the wider community life of an area, preferring instead to focus 
on the spiritual concerns of the congregation.  
Beyerlein and Hipp’s (2005) social capital thesis suggests that mainline religious 
communities are critical sources of the norms and networks that can underpin the growth of 
social cohesion in rural areas. Several studies in the US indicate that mainline Protestant and 
Catholic communities encourage the development of bridging social capital across an area by 
organizing community activities, providing support to the needy and volunteering to assist 
other organizations that serve local people (e.g. Wilson and Janoski, 1995; Wuthnow, 2004). 
A similar role has been identified for such communities within rural areas across England 
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(Russell, 2005). Mainline religious groups also play an increasingly important role as partners 
in the delivery of local public services in the United States (Chaves, 2004) and in England 
(Church Urban Fund, 2008), where in the latter case they often have responsibility for the 
provision of elementary schooling in rural areas. Such engagement with and across the 
breadth of the community may strengthen the connections between religious adherents and 
non-adherents alike, adding to a perception of cohesiveness within the local area. By contrast, 
Beyerlein and Hipp (2005) argue that the inward focus of evangelical religious communities 
may weaken rather than strengthen community bonds.  
In focusing their efforts on developing the cohesiveness of their own group, 
evangelical communities might restrict the growth of cross-group interactions and networks 
thereby depriving local areas of vital bridging social capital that might potentially be 
harnessed for the wider benefit of society (Iannacone, 1994). Such communities have 
sometimes been found to be less likely to participate in social programs or public service 
delivery than mainline religious communities (Chaves, 2004; Hoge et al., 1998). Although 
their activist doctrine may prompt them to engage in self-directed community development 
work (Menjivar, 200; Smith, 2002), evangelical religious groups may be especially prone to 
exhibiting the insularity sometimes associated with bonding social capital (Portes, 1998). 
This, in turn, may make it harder for them to develop links with out-group members, 
especially given the illiberal attitudes evangelical adherents are sometimes thought to evince 
(Smith, 2002). Thus, it is anticipated that a positive relationship between mainline religious 
communities and residents’ perceptions of social cohesion will be observed, but a negative 
one for evangelical religious communities. 
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Immigration and Social Cohesion 
Theories of social disorganization suggest that high levels of immigration are likely to disrupt 
social relations within an area (Shaw and McKay, 1969). Because cultivation of the degree of 
interpersonal trust underpinning the assimilation of newcomers within local communities 
requires substantial time and effort, sudden movements of population into an area represent a 
considerable challenge to residents’ perceptions of control over their environment (Kasarda 
and Janowitz, 1974; Sennett, 1970). The arrival of new residents with observably different 
ethnic origins, linguistic practices or cultural mores, in particular, can lead existing 
community members to feel (however unjustifiably) that they are becoming strangers in their 
own environment (Crowley and Lichter, 2009). Thus, although population growth is often 
indicative of increasing economic prosperity within an area, it can also present a serious test 
for levels of social cohesion (at least in the short term) (Bursik, 1988). Indeed, immigration 
and the apparent fragmentation of social identities in advanced democracies have led to what 
some observers describe as ‘a new crisis of social cohesion’ (Kearns and Forrest, 2000).  
Immigration poses a challenge for social cohesion in rural areas principally because of 
its impact on the perceptions of existing community members (Chavez, 2005; Crowley and 
Lichter, 2009). Anxieties about the arrival of new immigrant groups can be experienced by 
long-time residents of an area as a loss of control over the destiny of their current ‘imagined 
community’ (Sennett, 1970) – a perceived loss that is often resisted in more or less overt 
ways (Chavez, 2005). In part, this anxiety may reflect the ‘natural aversion to heterogeneity’ 
(Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002) identified by social identity theorists (e.g. Tajfel and Turner, 
1979; 1984), which ties group positive self-image to the maintenance of a negative out-group 
identity. According to this perspective, people tend to like others who more closely resemble 
themselves. Such anxieties could also be a product of feelings of ‘racial threat’, whereby 
ethnic and cultural prejudices are brought to the fore when the size and visibility of new 
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immigrant groups is much greater (Coenders and Scheepers, 1998; Quillian, 1995) – what 
Fennelly (2008) describes as a ‘symbolic threat’ which may or may not reflect reality.  
Contradicting the racial threat thesis, social contact theory suggests larger population 
movements might actually prompt greater interaction between newcomers and existing 
residents, and thereby reduce residents’ out-group hostility (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew and 
Tropp, 2006). Yet, collective action problems associated with influencing local affairs, such 
as the need for effective communication and coalition building, are also thought to be 
exacerbated by the introduction of diverse and potentially conflicting viewpoints on 
important community matters (see Walsh, 2006). As a result, rural areas experiencing high 
levels of immigration may not only have to overcome the negative effects of prejudice on 
cohesion, but also those associated with lower levels of political agreement (Alesina and La 
Ferrara, 2000). Whatever its possible origins, a negative relationship between immigration 
and social cohesion has been corroborated by a number of quantitative studies at the state and 
metropolitan levels suggesting that it weakens social bonds (e.g. Putnam, 2007; Shumaker 
and Stokols, 1982). This leads to the expectation that large movements of newcomers into 
rural areas will be negatively related to residents’ perceptions of social cohesion. 
 
Religious Communities, Immigration and Social Cohesion 
Rural restructuring has reinforced the role of key social and institutional bases of community 
strength within rural areas, such as local schools, businesses, and religious groups in the 
process of social integration (Cotter, 2004; Gray, 1994). And, there is some evidence to 
suggest that the involvement of religious communities in the pursuit of integration can have 
important benefits for rural areas. In addition to providing opportunities for the development 
of the bridging social capital that contributes to the growth of community cohesiveness more 
widely, mainline religious communities often participate in or coordinate activities, which 
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address the complex social problems experienced by immigrants (Farnell et al., 2006; 
Menjivar, 2003). As a result, they are sometimes better able to integrate migrants than are 
local state institutions, especially where immigrants are able to participate in religious 
communities to which they may have belonged in their native country (Romaniszyn, 1996). 
Research has highlighted that in areas rich in mainline religious communities, 
immigrants may find that social integration is made possible by accessing the social support 
that such communities can provide (Schneider, 2007). Indeed, the sheer numbers of sources 
of support in such areas is an important determinant of the rate and intensity of volunteer 
participation amongst immigrant groups (Handy and Greenspan, 2009). Thus, areas with 
stronger mainline religious communities may be especially resilient to social problems 
associated with immigration, as they possess a large stock of appropriable human and 
material resources for the purposes of social integration. Again, this may be especially 
important for immigrants affiliated to the mainline community in question. For example, 
Romaniszyn’s (1996) case study of Polish migrant workers in Athens, Greece, highlights the 
key role played by the Catholic Church there in enabling the immigrants to settle 
successfully. 
In contrast to mainline religious communities, evangelical ones have sometimes been 
thought less willing to engage with issues of immigration, due to their inward focus on the 
concerns of the church with which they are associated (Hagan, 2006). Nevertheless, although 
such communities often exhibit less liberal and more conservative social attitudes in general 
in both the US (Smith and Johnson, 2010) and the UK (Francis, 2008), there is growing 
evidence to suggest that evangelical communities are active in outreach to immigrants 
because they are seen (initially at least) as potential converts (Menjivar, 2003). Not only are 
immigrants potentially members in the making, but the focus of existing members on 
individual salvation through participation in religious activities amplifies their commitment to 
 12 
building the community of the faithful. African Pentecostal churches, which emerged in 
response to migrants’ needs, for instance, are growing in number and influence in England 
(Burgess, 2009) – though these communities (and many others like them) are typically 
located within urban rather than rural areas. 
All of the above leads to the expectation that rural areas with stronger mainline 
Christian communities will be able to moderate the negative relationship between 
immigration and perceptions of social cohesion. Those with stronger evangelical religious 
communities might benefit from the missionary zeal of those communities, but may also face 
a greater challenge in positively influencing residents’ attitudes than their mainline 
counterparts. Hence, it is anticipated that in rural areas with a large number of immigrants, 
those with more mainline Christian adherents will be likely to maintain a higher level of 
social cohesion than those with more evangelical adherents.  
 
Methodology 
The units of analysis are rural districts in England.
2
 Using data on all such areas minimizes 
the likelihood of sample selection bias and enhances the potential for generalizing the 
findings (Heckman, 1979). These areas are a highly pertinent context for investigating the 
relationship between religious communities, immigration and social cohesion. Under the 
previous Labour national government, faith groups became regarded as vital partners in the 
drive to build strong and cohesive communities across England, especially within rural areas 
(Department of Communities and Local Government, 2008a). This focus on the social 
benefits of faith is continuing under the current Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition 
government’s drive to promote what has been described as the ‘Big Society’ (Stunell, 2010). 
At the same time, the U.K. recently experienced one of the largest movements of population 
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in its history, when migrant workers from several Central and Eastern Europe countries were 
accorded the right to work there following their entry into the European Union (EU). 
 
Dependent Variable 
Friedkin (2004) suggests that social groups are cohesive when aggregate level conditions “are 
producing positive membership attitudes and behaviours” (p.410). Social cohesion is 
conceived in this paper as an ideational construct that reflects individuals’ perceptions of 
social life, rather than as a relational construct pertaining to the composition of their social 
networks (Moody and White, 2003). Empirically, the two approaches are not mutually 
exclusive, but the specific question of relational cohesion is left in the background for this 
study and the cohesiveness of rural areas considered in large part to be constituted by the 
attitudes of the people residing within those areas.  
Quantitative data on citizens’ perceptions of social cohesion can be drawn from the 
General User Survey conducted by local governments serving rural districts across England. 
The survey asked a representative sample of residents a series of questions about the quality 
of life in their local area, focusing in particular on their experience of community solidarity. 
Fieldwork for the survey took place between September and November 2006. A random or 
stratified random sample of respondents was drawn from the Small Users Postal Address File 
(PAF). Data were then collected by local governments using a standard questionnaire 
template, before being independently verified by the Audit Commission, a central 
government regulatory agency. Each local government was required to achieve a sample size 
of 1100 based on a confidence interval of +/-3% at the 95% confidence level. The collected 
data were finally weighted by age, gender, ethnicity and household size to ensure that the 
achieved sample was demographically representative. 
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The questions within the survey were all based on a 5-point response scale with the 
published figures used for the analysis showing the mean of responses for each district, 
calculated as those agreeing with the survey statements as a percentage of those responding to 
the question (see Department for Communities and Local Government, 2007). An item 
assessing whether respondents believed that people from diverse backgrounds got on well 
together in the area was included in the survey specifically to gauge perceived levels of social 
cohesion. This question is the standard survey item used by UK central government as an 
indicator of a cohesive society. It captures the overall degree of harmony between groupings 
based on social class and economic position, as well as those based on faith or ethnic 
identities (Department of Communities and Local Government, 2008b).  
 
Independent Variables 
To ensure that temporal causality runs in the correct direction, the independent variables are 
operationalised at least one year prior to the dependent variables.  
Religious communities. Based on data from a census of all Christian Churches in 
England carried out by Christian Research in May 2005, measures of adherence to five broad 
Christian denominations are used to gauge bridging and bonding social capital effects. The 
bridging social capital associated with mainline communities is captured using variables 
measuring the number of Anglican, Methodist and Roman Catholic adherents per 1000 
capita. The bonding social capital associated with evangelical communities is gauged by 
measuring the number of Baptist and Pentecostal adherents per 1000 capita, since, unlike 
Anglicanism and Methodism in the UK, these denominations are not directed by a central 
church, but rather adhere to a principle of local autonomy for each congregation. Adherence 
to Christianity has been on the wane in the UK for some years now (Voas and Crockett, 
2005). Nevertheless, the proportion of adherents amongst the local population is a good 
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proxy for social capital, since this measure captures the likely the relative size and therefore 
social and political influence of such communities. 
Immigration. Immigration is measured using a proxy for the arrival of a large group 
of migrant workers within the UK; the numbers of European Union Accession (EU A8) 
citizens allocated National Insurance (NI) numbers in English local government areas during 
2005. In the wake of the accession to the EU of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia in 2004, the UK Home Office estimated an 
annual rate of immigration of 5,000-13,000 EU A8 nationals (Dustmann et al, 2003). Not 
only was the level of worker migration associated with EU accession far greater than 
predicted (228,080 NI numbers were allocated to EU A8 citizens in 2005 alone), but its 
spatial distribution did not follow closely any established pattern of immigration from Central 
and Eastern Europe. In particular, the incidence of migrants was not limited to metropolitan 
areas, but was also high in rural locales across the country that previously had low levels of 
immigration (Drinkwater, Eade and Garapich, 2009).  
EU A8 citizens currently comprise about 50 per cent of the migrant worker population 
in rural England (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2011). Of these, most 
work in business administration and management, agriculture, hospitality/catering or 
manufacturing. In this respect, the rural migration following the accession of the A8 countries 
to the EU mirrors that associated with new immigrant destinations in rural America, with 
many workers finding employment in industries such as food processing (Crowley and 
Lichter, 2009). However, there is also divergence from those patterns of migration in terms of 
the numbers of migrants obtaining administrative positions, which perhaps reflects the fact 
that EU A8 citizens have the right to seek employment in England, unlike many of their 
undocumented counterparts in the U.S. 
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All in all, the great scale of the worker migration to England following EU 
enlargement in 2004 represents a kind of natural experiment for testing for the impact of 
immigration on social cohesion. It also offers an interesting case study of the relationships 
between religion and immigration, as all but one of the EU A8 countries (the Czech 
Republic) is predominantly Roman Catholic in religion, and so this group of migrant workers 
might be expected to integrate especially well in areas with stronger Catholic communities. 
The number of allocations to EU A8 citizens was summed, and the resulting figure divided 
by the size of the resident population to ensure that the measure was not distorted by greater 
movement into larger areas.  
 
Control Variables 
Socio-economic disadvantage. Relative levels of socio-economic disadvantage were 
measured using the average ward score on the indices of deprivation in 2004. This is the 
population-weighted measure used by UK central government constructed from indicators of: 
income, employment, health, education, housing, crime, living environment. Rural 
communities experiencing socio-economic disadvantage arguably have fewer resources with 
which to resolve collective action problems (Cloke et al. 1995), and tend to experience lower 
levels of community spirit as a result (Countryside Agency, 2000). 
Demographic diversity. The multiplication of social identities in socially 
heterogeneous areas may affect levels of citizen engagement. For example, ethnically diverse 
rural areas can suffer higher rates of crime (Osgood and Chambers, 2000), and the population 
is often more polarized between young and old and rich and poor in rural localities than in the 
city (Cloke et al. 1995). To measure demographic diversity, the proportions of the age, ethnic 
and social class sub-groups identified in the 2001 UK national census (such as children aged 
0-4, Black African and Lower Managerial and Professional Occupations) for each local 
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authority area were squared, summed and subtracted from 10,000, with high scores reflecting 
high diversity(see Trawick and Howsen, 2006). Social alienation. Population size and density 
figures drawn from the UK national census in 2001 control for the possibility that residents of 
smaller, less densely populated rural areas experience stronger social ties and 
correspondingly higher levels of social control (Wilkinson, 1984). Moreover, areas with more 
dense populations may offer greater opportunities for anti-social and criminal behaviour to 
flourish. For instance, prior research indicates that crime rates are lower in less populous rural 
areas (Osgood and Chambers, 2000). 
Community organizational life. Community organizational life in rural areas is 
measured as the number of community, social and personal services organisations (such as 
voluntary associations, film societies or sports clubs) per 1000 capita registering for value 
added (or goods and services) tax in 2005. This measure represents a good indicator of 
potential benefits for social cohesion of a larger number of CBOs being active within local 
areas and has been used in previous studies incorporating rural areas (e.g. Lee, 2008).  
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the all the variables used in the 
modelling of social cohesion across rural areas in England. Skewness tests revealed that 
social cohesion, Roman Catholic adherents, immigration, ethnic diversity, social class 
diversity, population density and community organizations were not normally distributed 
across rural areas (test results of -2.63, 2.19, 4.89, 2.31, 3.21, 6.86 and 1.98). Logged versions 
of the positively skewed variables were used in the analysis, and a squared version of the 
dependent variable– the results are the same for the uncorrected social cohesion measure. 
 




Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression models of the relationship between religious 
communities, immigration and social cohesion are shown in Table 2: the first model regresses 
the independent and control variables onto perceptions of cohesion. In the second model, 
interactions between religious communities and immigration are included to test whether 
bridging social capital effects associated with mainline adherents extend to the social 
integration of immigrants, and whether the outreach orientation of evangelical adherents 
might also be evident in this context. The findings are not distorted by multicollinearity as the 
average Variance Inflation Factor score for the independent variables is about 1.6 (Bowerman 
and O’Connell, 1990). Breusch-Pagan tests for heteroskedasticity revealed the presence of 
nonconstant error variance, so robust estimation of the standard errors was carried out. 
 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The statistical results for the first model provide mixed support for the anticipated 
relationships between the control variables and social cohesion. The coefficient for 
deprivation has a negative sign and is statistically significant. The coefficient for ethnic 
diversity is negative, as expected, and has a weak statistically significant association with 
residents’ perceptions of social cohesion. The results for age and social class diversity, 
however, do not support the proposed argument on their relationship with social cohesion. 
The expected relationship between sources of social alienation and social cohesion too 
receives no corroboration. When controlling for other relevant variables, population density 
is not related to social cohesion, and, contrary to expectations, population exhibits a positive 
relationship. It is conceivable that residents in large communities may share a greater sense of 
communal pride (Lekwa, Rice and Hibbing, 2007). Finally, areas benefiting from vibrant 
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community organizational life have significantly higher levels of cohesiveness. This finding 
on social cohesion in rural areas mirrors evidence on the positive externalities associated with 
community organizational life across urban areas (e.g. Sampson et al., 2005).  
Taken in combination, the religious community measures make a statistically 
significant addition to the explanatory power of the first model (F ratio = 3.54, p≤.01). 
Moreover, the anticipated distinction between the bridging and bonding effects of mainline 
and evangelical Christian communities is largely confirmed. Perceptions of social cohesion 
are positively associated with a higher proportion of Anglican and Methodist adherents 
within an area, while a greater share of Baptists and Pentecostals is associated with lower 
cohesion. However, the coefficient for Roman Catholic adherents, though positive, is 
statistically insignificant. It is possible to derive the substantive effects of these variables 
from a model predicting the non-squared version of the dependent variable. The coefficients 
for this model (available on request) suggest that a ten percent increase in the proportion of 
Anglicans within an area would result, on average, in a one percent increase in the mean rate 
of social cohesion in rural areas in England. For Methodists, a similar increase in the 
proportion of adherents would result in a two per cent growth in cohesion, for Baptists a three 
percent reduction and for Pentecostal adherents a four per cent drop.  
The immigration measure makes an extremely large statistically significant 
improvement in the explanatory power of the regression model (F ratio = 44.62, p≤.001). 
High levels of economic in-migration therefore appear to be having a detrimental effect on 
perceived social cohesion across rural areas in England, even when controlling for other 
relevant variables. In fact, interpretation of the substantive effect of this variable suggests that 
a ten percent increase in the number of migrant workers entering an area would result in a 
one percent decrease in social cohesion – an effect, which has great resonance in this case 
given that the migration of EU A8 citizens was about seventeen times greater than predicted. 
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This finding corroborates case study research suggesting that residents in rural areas 
experiencing high rates of EU A8 immigration have been susceptible to feelings of ‘racial 
threat’ (Dawney, 2008). It also illustrates that the effects of prejudice and out-group hostility 
on perceptions of social cohesion include cultural as well as racial biases, mirroring the 
findings of studies that reveal the strains that white ethnic diversity can sometimes place on 
perceptions of community attachment (Rice and Steele, 2001). 
In sum, these findings highlight that the social integration of new immigrant groups in 
rural areas is likely to be very challenging. To explore the potentially positive role religious 
communities may play in immigrant integration, it is necessary to examine the extent to 
which they may moderate the negative relationship between immigration and social cohesion 
shown in the first regression model. This requires the entry of interaction terms in the 
statistical model.  
The interactions between religious communities and immigration shown in Table 2 
make a statistically significant addition to the explanatory power of the first regression model 
(F ratio = 4.15, p≤.002).3 Two of the five interactions offer strong confirmation of the 
argument that mainline religious communities fulfil an important role in the social integration 
of immigrants: the coefficients for Anglican adherents and Roman Catholic adherents x 
immigration are both positive and statistically significant, with the latter appearing to have an 
especially strong relationship with social cohesion. None of the other interactions are 
statistically significant.  
To fully explore the statistically significant interaction effects it is necessary to 
calculate the marginal effects of immigration on cohesion at varying levels of the moderator 
variables (i.e. Anglican or Catholic adherents) (see Brambor, Clark and Golder, 2006). 
Graphing the slope and confidence intervals of the marginal effects is the most effective way 
to present this information. Accordingly, Figures 1 and 2 provide a graphical illustration of 
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the moderating influence of Anglican and Catholic communities on the relationship between 
worker migration and social cohesion.  
 
INSERT FIGURES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Figure 1 confirms that the strength of the Anglican community within an area is likely 
to have an important moderating effect on the relationship between immigration and social 
cohesion. In particular, as the number of adherents per capita moves from its minimum to 
maximum level (10.13 to 61.05) the negative effect of immigration clearly decreases. 
However, the point at which this negative relationship becomes statistically insignificant 
(where the upper confidence interval meets the zero line on the graph) is beyond the range of 
the data (about 130 Anglicans per 1000 capita). By contrast, figure 2 indicates that as the 
number of Catholic adherents rises from its minimum to its maximum level (6.9 for the 
logged version of the measure used in the regression model) the negative relationship 
between immigration and residents’ perceptions of cohesion is eventually eradicated.  
On balance, the results presented in the figures support the conclusion that mainline 
religious communities have important moderating effects on the negative relationship 
between immigration and social cohesion – at least for this sample of rural areas in England. 
In particular, a greater share of Anglicans and (especially) Roman Catholics within an area is 
likely to enhance the prospects of immigrant integration within an area. However, no such 
moderating relationship was observed for rural areas with greater numbers of Methodist 
adherents, or for those with greater numbers of evangelical adherents. There are several 
possible explanations for these findings 
In addition to the bridging social capital effects associated with its outward looking 
focus, the Anglican community is able to draw on an especially strong base of institutional 
support for community development activity. Although regular church attendance has 
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declined in recent years, the Church of England remains both the largest and well-resourced 
religious institution in rural areas across the country. Thus, despite comparatively small 
congregations by US standards, the Anglican community is still a strong focus for civic 
activism and volunteering. Indeed, in many rural areas the resident Church of England priest 
and lay clergy may be the only non-governmental or non-private actors with access to 
resources, such as people and buildings, suitable to support such community-wide activities 
(Farnell et al. 2006; Russell, 2005). They are also likely to have strong links with or be 
actively involved in the schools within an area (Berkeley and Vij, 2008), many of which may 
be attended by the children of migrant workers. In terms of sheer scale and capacity to assist 
in the process of incorporating immigrants within rural areas, the Anglican community may 
therefore be second only to the local state in its reach. 
Although a linear positive relationship with perceptions of social cohesion was not 
observed for Roman Catholic adherence, a moderating effect on the impact of immigration on 
cohesion emerges very strongly. Like the Church of England, the Roman Catholic Church 
has the organizational presence and resources to support community activities across a wide 
range of geographical areas. However, the capacity supporting the outreach of the Catholic 
community is likely to be much more thinly spread than that underpinning the community 
service of the Anglican community. In this instance, then, it is likely that there is an 
additional factor at work that explains the strength of the interaction effect. That factor is 
almost certainly the religious adherence of the Central and East European migrant workers. 
Apart from the Czech Republic, all the other EU A8 countries are predominantly Roman 
Catholic in religion. In particular, Poland, the country from which the vast majority of the 
migrant workers emanate, is overwhelmingly Roman Catholic, with very high rates of 
religious belief (almost 90%) and observance (over 50%) (European Commission, 2005). The 
finding in the final regression model is therefore suggestive of distinctive bridging social 
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capital effects attributable to the values of Catholic adherents in the host country and within 
the new immigrant group.  
Finally, it is noteworthy that the share of evangelical adherents neither strengthened 
nor weakened the negative relationship between immigration and perceived social cohesion. 
This indicates that while these religious communities may play little positive role in the 
integration of immigrants, neither do they appear to make integration more difficult. It is 
possible that the inward focus of the Baptist and Pentecostal communities in England leads 
them to take less interest in reaching out to immigrant groups than those in the U.S., though it 
is also probable that they lack the organizational capacity to do such outreach work to the 
same degree as the mainline communities in rural England. Further research on the role of 
evangelical communities within rural areas could illuminate this interesting issue. 
 
Conclusions 
This paper has provided quantitative evidence on the relationship between religious 
communities, immigration and perceptions of social cohesion across rural areas in England. 
In keeping with the bridging and bonding social capital hypotheses advanced in the paper, 
mainline Protestant religious communities are associated with more cohesive communities, 
and evangelical ones with less social cohesion. At the same time, worker migration from 
Central and Eastern Europe has a strong negative relationship with social cohesion. However, 
the strength of Anglican and (especially) Roman Catholic communities within rural areas 
may mitigate the negative relationship between immigration and perceptions of cohesiveness, 
thereby enhancing the prospects of social integration. These findings have important 
theoretical and practical implications. 
The analysis presented here builds on existing theoretical and empirical work on 
religious communities in rural areas, providing a direct test of the links between those 
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communities, immigration and social cohesion. Prior studies have examined the separate 
effects of these phenomenon using crime rates (e.g. Lee and Bartowski, 2004) or residents’ 
perceptions of community attachment (Brehm, Eisenhauer and Krannich, 2004; Brown, 
Dorius and Krannich, 2005). Until now, the combined effects of these phenomena have not 
been investigated within the same study, nor have their separate effects on residents’ 
perceptions of the cohesiveness of their community been considered. What emerges from this 
analysis is a pattern of immigrant integration in rural areas, which provides some support for 
both the ‘racial threat’ and ‘social contact’ hypotheses. In the first instance, higher rates of 
worker migration are associated with weaker social cohesion, yet it appears that the presence 
of strong mainline religious communities can enable feelings of racial threat to be overcome. 
This suggests that there may be great potential for bringing together these two arguments 
about inter-group relations within a framework for empirical analysis, which gives greater 
recognition to the complex temporal processes at work in immigrant integration in rural 
areas. It also points towards the need for more in-depth qualitative ethnographic research 
around this issue as well as longitudinal quantitative studies to explore the causal 
mechanisms associated with immigrant integration in greater detail. 
Despite the strength of the findings, the analysis presented here has limitations. The 
statistical results may simply be a product of when and where the survey was conducted. 
Rural England has a very particular social structure, which may not map closely onto rural 
life elsewhere. Although Christian communities in England often play a similar role in 
supporting community activities as their counterparts in rural America, the salience of 
participation within those communities for rural residents has been in decline for some years 
now. The findings presented here may therefore speak to the on-going institutional 
embeddedness of mainline communities rather than their doctrines or beliefs that they 
espouse, or the commitment and outreach work of their members. Thus, it would be 
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important to examine in more detail, how, and in what ways, that embeddedness influences 
the prospects of immigrant integration    
Similarly, evidence on the relationship between social cohesion and the arrival of 
other immigrant groups than those studied here would enable the dynamics of the 
immigration-cohesion relationship to be explored further. Although the sudden movement of 
large numbers of immigrants into rural areas is not common in England, such population 
shifts are more frequent in other countries, including the U.S. where African-American and 
Latino migration in non-metropolitan areas is now extremely widespread (Donato et al., 
2007). The relationships observed here between Central and East European immigration and 
cohesion may take different forms for alternative immigrant groups. For example, the 
overwhelming whiteness of rural England is sometimes thought to make long-time residents 
especially hostile to non-white immigrant groups (Chakraborti and Garland, 2004).
 
How the 
process of integration occurs for different immigrant groups is a topic of vital importance for 
future research.
4
 Finally, by focusing on social cohesion at the aggregate level across rural 
areas the findings are susceptible to problems associated with drawing inferences about 
individual attitudes from aggregated data (Blakeley and Woodward 2000). Subsequent 
research could therefore build on this study by investigating religious communities, 
immigration and social cohesion using multi-level modelling.
5
 
The findings presented here indicate that religious communities and recent 
immigration have an especially large statistically significant independent effect on 
perceptions of social cohesion. They also highlight that mainline religious communities can 
moderate negative externalities for social cohesion associated with the arrival of large 
numbers of newcomers in rural areas. Whether as a product of their embeddedness within the 
institutions of rural England, their doctrine of social responsibility or their strong connections 
with affiliated immigrant religious groups, mainline communities seem to manifest bridging 
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social capital, which offers the prospect of improved immigrant integration in this setting. 
This implies that more should be done to understand how the role of these communities in 
promoting the integration of newcomers in local areas can be supported. Future studies of the 
relationship between religious communities, immigration and social cohesion in rural areas 
should therefore seek to include measures of the policy interventions and strategies designed 




Unfortunately, there are currently no data available at the rural district level on the religious 
character of elementary schools, with which to explore the relationship between religious 
communities and this particular institutional structure in more depth.  
2 
To ensure that the analysis focused on rural areas, only data from local governments serving 
rural communities (known as district councils) were entered in the statistical models. These 
governments were selected on the basis of the urban-rural administrative area classification 
used by UK central government (see Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, 2002). This 
classifies local government areas as rural or urban on the basis of an index of population 
density, overall employment, public transport usage, agricultural employment, 
mining/energy/water production employment and ethnic homogeneity.  
3
 It should be noted that the coefficients for the separate effects of religious communities and 
immigration shown in the second model cannot be compared directly with those in the first 
one. The coefficients in the model including the interaction terms show the effects of each of 
these two variables when the other is set to zero (Jaccard and Turrisi, 2003). For example, the 
significantly negative coefficient for Anglican adherence in the interactions model is derived 
from an assumption that immigration is zero, which is beyond the range of the data (as shown 
in table 1).  
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4
 Repeating the analysis presented in the paper for a measure of non-EUA8 immigration 
reveals similar results to those for EU A8 immigration, albeit with one important exception – 
the interaction between non-EUA8 immigration and Pentecostal adherents is negative and 
statistically significant. Systematic investigation of variations across alternative groupings of 
these non EUA8 immigrants (e.g. non-white immigrant groups from former U.K. colonies) 
would constitute a research agenda in its own right, and so due to space constraints is not 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
 Mean Min Max s.d. 
Social cohesion 80.59 38.00 89.00 7.21 
Anglican attendance per 1000 capita 27.57 10.13 61.05 9.24 
Methodist attendance per 1000 capita 8.16 0.95 29.05 5.57 
Roman Catholic attendance per 1000 
capita 
13.30 0.00 57.82 7.20 
Baptist attendance per 1000 capita 5.08 0.00 17.00 3.74 
Pentecostal attendance per 1000 capita 1.69 .00 6.75 1.41 
Recent immigration per 1000 capita 3.53 0.41 33.00 3.64 
Deprivation 14.51 6.20 32.57 5.66 
Ethnic diversity 919.45 260.37 4020.04 614.67 
Age diversity 8680.73 7279.36 9932.64 275.44 
Social class diversity 8763.09 8051.43 9837.77 151.07 
Population  94415.78 24457 169331 30659.16 
Population density  213.74 23.19 2794.87 272.42 
Community-based organisations per 
1000 capita 
2.85 1.14 8.56 1.10 
Data sources: 
Deprivation 
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Table 2. Religious communities, immigration and social cohesion in rural areas 
 
 Slope s.e. Slope s.e. 
Anglicans (A) 14.216* 7.830 -8.708 9.668 
Methodists (M) 32.113** 11.599 23.179 19.568 
Roman Catholics (log) (C) -145.784 392.437 -7678.357** 2494.623 
Baptists (B) -41.704* 18.156 -62.780* 27.796 
Pentecostals (P) -68.073+ 52.246 -48.702 65.878 
Recent immigration (log) (I) -772.158** 115.589 -9230.077** 2692.071 
Interaction terms 
    
A x I   21.200* 10.312 
M x I   8.411 14.542 
C x I   1260.608** 436.057 
B x I   21.762 27.941 
P x I   -23.508 54.707 
Control variables 
    
Deprivation -36.573* 16.676 -34.436* 17.365 
Ethnic diversity (log) -286.662+ 16.676 -142.038 152.421 
Age diversity .131 .229 .118 .229 
Social class diversity
 
(log) 27462.58** 8484.347 21171.34* 8962.708 
Population  .008** .003 .007* .003 
Population density (log) -125.554 120.924 -171.642 120.192 
Community-based 
organisations (log) 
1122.268** 289.835 939.361** 294.612 
Constant -101063.2** 33620.58 -105880** 36317.99 
F-statistic 8.37**  11.91**  
R
2
 .59  .64  
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Figure 1 Marginal impact of immigration on social cohesion contingent on Anglican 
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Figure 2 Marginal impact of immigration on social cohesion contingent on catholic 
adherents in an area (95% confidence interval) 
 
